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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
The state appeals from the district court's order dismissing a charge of felony DUI.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Charles Bradley Price with felony DUI. (R., pp. 50-52.) The
bases for the felony charge were two prior misdemeanor convictions within ten years. (R.,
p. 52.) Price moved to dismiss the felony, claiming that one of the prior misdemeanor
convictions was invalid and could not be used for enhancement purposes because Price had
been denied his right to counsel. (R., pp. 59-62.) The state opposed the motion. (R., p.
66.) The parties stipulated to admission of exhibits from the challenged misdemeanor
proceedings. (R., p. 69, 73; Tr., p. 4, L. 16 - p. 5, L. 21; Defense Exhibits A-F.)
The district court found, in relation to the challenged prior misdemeanor conviction,
that Price was informed before his arraignment of his right to have an attorney and to have
one at state expense. (R., pp. 75-76.) He "did not have counsel" at his arraignment "but
informed the Magistrate that he was going to look into getting an attorney." (R., p. 75.)
At a subsequent proceeding he "pled guilty to a second charge of Driving Under the
Influence." (R., p. 75.) He was not represented at that time. (R., pp. 75-76.) Before taking
the plea, the magistrate asked if Price was "representing [himself] today" and Price
responded that he was. (R., p. 76.) There was no further discussion ofrepresentation and
the minutes do not state that Price waived the right to counsel. (R., p. 76.) The district
court rejected the state's argument that by affirmatively choosing to represent himself after
being fully informed of his right to be represented by counsel, Price was necessarily
choosing not to invoke his right to counsel instead of being denied his right to counsel. (R.,
1

pp. 77-78.) Concluding instead that the record was "silent" as to whether Price waived the
right to counsel, the district court held that the challenged prior misdemeanor could not be
used to enhance the DUI to a felony and granted the motion to dismiss. (R., pp. 75-80.)
The state filed a timely notice of appeal from the district court's order. (R., pp. 82-84.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court erroneously conclude that Price had proven that he was denied
his right to counsel at the prior misdemeanor proceedings?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erroneously Concluded That Price Was Denied The Right To Counsel
Where The Record Shows He Knowingly And Intelligently Chose To Represent Himself
A.

Introduction
The district court held that absent an express waiver of counsel, the pnor

misdemeanor DUI conviction could not be used to enhance the current DUI offense to a
felony. (R., pp. 77-79.) In doing so the district court committed two errors, both of which
are reversible. First, the district court reversed the burden of proof and required the state
to prove Price was not denied the right to counsel, instead of imposing upon Price the
burden of proving he was denied the right to counsel as required by Supreme Court
precedent. Second, the law allows only a collateral attack for the denial of counsel.
Because the record shows that Price made a knowing and intelligent choice to represent
himself, the district court erred in concluding that he was denied the right to counsel.

B.

Standard Of Review
"When a violation of a constitutional right is asserted, this Court will accept the

trial court's factual findings unless such findings are clearly erroneous; however, this Court
will freely review whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the
facts found." State v. Farfan-Galvan, 161 Idaho 610, 613, 389 P.3d 155, 158 (2016).

C.

The District Court Erroneously Concluded That The Record Was Silent Where The
Record Shows Price Made A Knowing And Voluntary Choice To Represent
Himself
"'It is well settled that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused

person, who has been advised by competent counsel, may not be collaterally
attacked."' Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998) (quoting Mabry v.
4

Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508 (1984)). A collateral attack on a prior conviction for denial of
the right to counsel is permitted, however. Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 493-97
(1994). See also Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295, 303 (2005) ("We recognized
only one exception to this rule that collateral attacks were off-limits, and that was for
challenges to state convictions allegedly obtained in violation of the right to appointed
counsel .... "); State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 94, 90 P.3d 314, 319 (2004) (there is "no right
under the United States Constitution to collaterally attack the validity of . . . prior
misdemeanor DUI convictions" other than for "the denial of counsel"). This is because
where a defendant "was denied his right to counsel" in a prior proceeding, his conviction
is "void." Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 114 (1967).
"[I]n a collateral attack on an uncounseled conviction, it is the defendant's burden
to prove that he did not competently and intelligently waive his right to the assistance
of counsel." Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 92 (2004). "[T]he information a defendant must
have to waive counsel intelligently will depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and
circumstances surrounding that case."

Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).

Tovar's collateral attack on a prior OWI (operating while intoxicated) conviction failed
where he "never claimed that he did not fully understand the charge or the range of
punishment for the crime prior to pleading guilty," "never articulated with precision the
additional information counsel could have provided, given the simplicity of the charge,"
and did not "assert that he was unaware of his right to be counseled prior to and at his
arraignment." Id at 92-93 (internal quotations, brackets and emphasis omitted).
Price, like Tovar, never claimed that he did not fully understand the charge or the
range of punishment for the crime prior to pleading guilty, never articulated with precision
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the additional information counsel could have provided, given the simplicity of the charge,
and did not assert that he was unaware of his right to be counseled prior to and at his
arraignment. To the contrary, the record shows that Price was fully informed of his right
to counsel, including his right to appointed counsel. At his arraignment Price affirmatively
represented he had "[heard] [his] rights on the video." (Exhibit B (Tr., p. 2, Ls. 4-8).) The
video explained a criminal defendant's rights, including the right to counsel and the right
to appointed counsel. (Exhibit A, at 00:30 - 00:40.) Price stated that he understood his
rights as explained in the video. (Exhibit B (Tr., p. 2, Ls. 9-10).) He told the judge that he
was "going to look into getting an attorney." (Exhibit B (Tr., p. 2, Ls. 15-18).) The record
establishes that Price understood he had the right to an attorney and the right to appointed
counsel ifhe could not afford an attorney.
The judge accepted a plea of not guilty and set a pre-trial about six weeks later, on
January 19, 2017. (Exhibit B (Tr., p. 2, L. 21 - p. 3, L. 3); Exhibit C.) Price submitted no
evidence of what happened at the original pre-trial. At a later pre-trial, on March 9, 2017,
the parties entered a plea agreement whereby the state would amend the charge from an
excessive second offense to a non-excessive first offense in exchange for a guilty plea to
the amended charge, and would not object to a withheld judgment. (Exhibit D.) The case
was set on March 31, 2017, for the change of plea. (Exhibit D.) The evidence shows Price
fully understood the charge and the range of punishment for the crime prior to pleading
guilty. Furthermore, Price never articulated what additional information counsel could
have provided, given the simplicity of the charge.
At the change of plea hearing, the judge asked Price ifhe was representing himself
and Price stated that he was. (Exhibit B (Tr., p. 4, Ls. 4-9).) Price then confirmed his
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understanding that he was there to enter a guilty plea pursuant to the terms of the plea
agreement. (Exhibit B (Tr., p. 4, Ls. 10-21).) Price then entered his plea. (Exhibit B (Tr.,
p. 4, L. 22 - p. 5, L. 9).)
Like Tovar, Price "never claimed that he did not fully understand the charge or the
range of punishment for the crime prior to pleading guilty," "never articulated with
precision the additional information counsel could have provided, given the simplicity of
the charge," and did not "assert that he was unaware of his right to be counseled prior to
and at his arraignment." Tovar, 541 U.S. at 92-93 (internal quotations, brackets and
emphasis omitted). To the contrary, the record shows that Price fully understood his rights,
including his right to counsel and his right to appointed counsel, and affirmatively chose
to represent himself. Indeed, Price's exchange with the judge just prior to entering his plea
(Exhibit B (Tr., p. 4, Ls. 8-9 ("THE COURT: Are you representing yourself today? THE
DEFENDANT: Yes.") is indistinguishable from the exchange in Tovar, 541 U.S. at 82
("'Did you want to represent yourself at today's hearing?' ... 'Yes, sir."'). Price failed to
prove that he was denied the right to counsel.
In holding otherwise, the district court made two errors. First, it held that that the

state "'bears the burden of establishing a valid waiver, and courts should indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights."' (R., p. 79
(quoting State v. Contreras-Gonzales, 146 Idaho 41, 45, 190 P.3d 197,201 (Ct. App. 2008)
(internal quotation omitted)).) That burden, however, applies in the context of the state
claiming that a charged and represented defendant waived his right prior to talking to police
without the presence of counsel. Contreras-Gonzales, 146 Idaho at 44-45, 190 P.3d at 20001. That is not the standard applicable in this case, which involves no such claim by the
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state. As noted above, when a defendant mounts a collateral attack on a judgment that
must otherwise be presumed valid, "it is the defendant's burden to prove that he did not
competently and intelligently waive his right to the assistance of counsel." Tovar, 541 U.S.
at 92 (emphasis added). The district court's reversal and expansion of the burden of proof
is error enough alone to merit reversal and remand.
However, the more egregious error was the district court's conclusion that Price's
knowing and voluntary choice to represent himself was the equivalent of a silent record
demonstrating a denial of the right to counsel. (R., pp. 77-78.) The district court concluded
that without an affirmative and express waiver of counsel, Price was denied his right to
counsel. (R., pp. 77-79.) An affirmative or express waiver is not, however, required under
the applicable law.
This "magic words" approach to waiver of counsel was expressly and implicitly
rejected in Tovar. As the Court stated in that case, a defendant "may choose to forgo
representation." Tovar, 541 U.S. at 87 (emphasis added). The Court has not "prescribed
any formula or script to be read to a defendant who states that he elects to proceed without

counsel." Id. at 88 (emphasis added). Rather, the determination is based on "a range of
case-specific factors, including the defendant's education or sophistication, the complex or
easily grasped nature of the charge, and the stage of the proceeding." Id. Thus, for
example, a defendant choosing to represent himself at trial requires warnings on the
dangers of self-representation that do not necessarily apply "at earlier stages of the criminal
process." Id. at 88-89. Ultimately, the lower court erred by imposing a requirement of
specific warnings prior to self-representation at a guilty plea because "the information a
defendant must have to waive counsel intelligently will depend, in each case, upon the
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particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case." Id. at 92 (internal quotation and
citation omitted). The record in this case established that Price, with full understanding of
his right to be represented by counsel, chose to represent himself. The record is not "silent"
about that choice. Because Price made an informed and intelligent choice to represent
himself, he was not denied the right to counsel.
The district court relied primarily upon the case of State v. Farfan-Galvan, 161
Idaho 610,389 P.3d 155 (2016). That case, however, has meaningful factual dissimilarities
that distinguish it from this instant case. Farfan-Galvan, in relation to his prior DUI
conviction, appeared at the courthouse counter after his arrest and release and signed a
notification of rights, a notification of penalties for future DUis, a guilty plea form, and a
notice of hearing. Id. at 611-12, 389 P.3d at 156-57. A few days later Farfan-Galvan
submitted a request for appointment of counsel which was denied for unspecified reasons.
Id. at 612, 389 P.3d at 157. The first time Farfan-Galvan appeared before a judge was for
sentencing. Id. The following exchange occurred before the sentencing:
THE COURT: Edgar Farfan-Galvan, CR-10-10207. Mr. Galvan, are you
represented by counsel?
THE DEFENDANT: What's that?
THE COURT: Do you have a lawyer?
THE DEFENDANT: I don't.
THE COURT: Okay. What would you like to say before I decide what I
should do?
Id. The Idaho Supreme Court found it"[ o]f particular significance to this appeal" that there
was "no indication in the record that Farfan-Galvan waived his right to counsel." Id. The
lack of any indication that Farfan-Galvan waived his right to counsel was significant
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because "waiver of counsel cannot be presumed from a silent record." Id. at 614, 389 P.3d
at 159.
In Farfan-Galvan the defendant was informed of his rights, but his only statement
about a lawyer was that he did not have one. Here, however, Price, with full knowledge
that he had a right to be represented by a lawyer, stated he was representing himself.
Stating that one is not represented by counsel is a far different statement than a statement
that one is representing himself. Thus the facts of this case are not in line with FarfanGalvan, but are instead not meaningfully distinguishable from Tovar, which facts the
Supreme Court of the United States determined did not show a denial of the right to
counsel. Simply stated, where a defendant knowingly chooses between two known but
mutually exclusive rights-the right to be represented by counsel and the right to represent
oneself-he has not been denied the right to counsel. Because Price made a knowing and
voluntary choice to represent himself, he was not denied the right to counsel.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's order
dismissing the felony DUI and remand for further proceedings.
DATED this 14th day of April, 2020.

/ s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 14th day of April, 2020, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the attorney listed below by
means of iCourt File and Serve:
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER

/ s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
KKJ/dd
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